In this paper, we study the waste haven hypothesis, which predicts that waste materials will be exported from high-income developed countries with stringent environmental regulations to developing countries with less rigorous environmental protection. Using data on Japanese export of recyclable waste resources (plastic waste, waste paper, iron and steel scrap, and nonferrous metal scraps), we find evidence from our econometric analysis that Asian countries provide a waste haven for Japan. In particular, Japan exports waste materials to Asian countries with low per capita incomes and large markets. We suggest that environmental regulation should be tightened to reduce waste trade in Asia.
Introduction
Stringent environmental regulations in industrialized countries may lead to a dramatic rise in the cost of waste disposal, which in turn motivates developed countries to export their waste to developing countries. Growing worldwide debate on the surging trade in waste led to the Basel Convention in 1989, which was ratified not only by developed countries, but also by many Asian developing countries. One of the most important aims of the Basel Convention was the regulation of trans-boundary waste shipments. 1 In spite of its participation in the convention, Asia has the largest trade in waste flows in the world. 2 The magnitude of these flows appears to be driven by the demand for and supply of recyclable resources. Asian developing countries have a large demand for waste and recyclable resources because their rapid economic growth has led to a shortage of natural resources. Large low-income countries such as China and India have a particularly high demand for natural resources. 3 On the supply side, higher income countries such as Japan would generate more waste, because some wastes are by-products of production and come from final consumption. Although high-income countries legitimately implement stringent regulations for recycling and waste disposal, this raises the cost of waste disposal. Given these regulations, there is an incentive to export large amounts of recyclable waste materials to reduce the cost of waste disposal. Moreover, economic integration and fragmentation in Asia has increased trade in final products, parts, and components. 4 This further increases trade in waste. Finally, transboundary trade in waste has increased because not all countries recycle and some developing countries lack their own recycling technology.
Trade in recyclable waste resources leads to economic gains and losses for wasteimporting countries (Kojima 2005; Kojima 2011; Higashida and Managi 2014) . In general, waste-importing countries are developing countries that are cost-competitive in laborintensive recycling processes and have greater demand for recycled resources. Further, these countries often have less-stringent environmental regulations due to government inability to implement effective regulations. Trade in recyclable waste helps to preserve natural resources and provides recycling and employment opportunities in many lowincome countries. Nevertheless, according to the evidence obtained and case studies conducted by Kojima (2005) , these benefits are limited. Indeed, recycling activities can cause serious environmental damage and health problems because waste often includes contaminated and hazardous materials. Importing countries may experience environmental damage due to the absence of reliable recycling processes and facilities, or the improper 1 In 1994, the Basel Convention accepted the Basel Ban, which prohibits all trans-boundary movements of hazardous wastes that are destined for final disposal from OECD to non-OECD states. As of 2012, 178 countries had signed the Convention. The Convention was ratified by many Asian countries such as China, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore. Japan ratified it in 1993. Krueger (2001) discusses the impact of the Basel Convention on international trade in hazardous waste.
treatment of hazardous material. Thus, it is important to prevent the illegal and illicit transboundary movement of waste.
Waste-exporting countries such as Japan have an incentive to export their waste. In developed countries, recycling policies that increase the collection of recyclables for domestic disposal or export have been implemented. Introducing stringent regulations increases the cost of waste disposal, and the resulting oversupply of waste increases exports to countries with lax regulations. Firms that reduce the costs of disposal through exporting raise their profits. On the other hand, relocating recycling activities to foreign countries can reduce pollution and health damage in developed countries. Thus, the policy evaluation depends on the source of the cost saving. Taking advantage of wage differentials and factor abundance implies the benefit of comparative advantage, whereas exporting to countries with lax environmental regulations implies detrimental effects.
To provide clarity, it is important to define "waste" before we begin our analysis. Because of the importance of this topic, waste has been categorized by a number of organizations.
The OECD provides precise definitions of waste, hazardous waste, and disposal. 7 Our sample covers a wider range of waste products than that of Higashida and Managi (2014) , who chose five waste and scrap products (waste, parings, and scrap). Our data include their five products.
Literature review and this paper
The trade and environment literature has considered the impact of trade liberalization on the environment. A major question addressed in this field is whether trade liberalization can reduce global emissions (Copeland and Taylor 1999; Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001; Dean 2002) . This literature advances the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH), which argues that stringent environmental regulation may lead to changes in trade and industry location patterns. According to this hypothesis, stringent environmental regulation will cause the more heavily regulated country to (1) increase imports of pollution-intensive goods and (2) cause its pollution-intensive sectors to engage in foreign direct investment. Empirically, the PHH is explored by Eskeland and Harrison (2003) , Ederington, Levinson, and Minier (2005) , and Okubo (2010, 2014) . In contrast with the PHH, Kellenberg (2012) proposes the WHH. The WHH differs from the PHH in its prediction that stringent regulations will give rise to the export of physical waste materials to lax regulation countries, rather than the PHH's predictions regarding the import of pollutionintensive products or the relocation of production.
A small but growing literature tests the WHH using the gravity model to identify the determinants of trade in waste. Under the standard specification,
, trade flows are positively affected by the GDP levels of exporters (i) and importers (j) and inversely related to geographical distance. Baggs (2009) was the first to study international trade in hazardous waste in 89 countries using the gravity model as specified by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) . This model takes into account firm heterogeneity and incorporates an export selection mechanism. By extending Baggs (2009) , Kellenberg (2012) estimated a gravity model of bilateral waste trade in 92 countries, using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . 9 He found that environmental regulation gaps between countries increase trade in waste. Similarly, Higashida and Managi (2014) estimated the standard gravity model at the product level. In all three studies, the gravity equation estimates are similar to those for trade in general. In particular, GDP and GDP per capita in importing and exporting countries increase trade in waste, whereas geographic distance reduces trade in waste.
The use of the gravity model may lead to specification problems, however. First, the gravity model is not completely consistent with the economic arguments that underpin the WHH. The stylized facts presented by Kellenberg (2012) and Higashida and Managi (2014) show that most trade waste flows from developed countries (those with high GDP and GDP per capita) to developing countries (those with low GDP and GDP per capita) rather than between developed countries. 10 This is problematic for the gravity model because it predicts that the largest trade flows should be between pairs of rich countries, such as OECD countries. Because the gravity model outcomes are not consistent with our observation of typical trade-waste patterns from rich to poor countries and between poor countries, the gravity model is not perfectly suited for testing the WHH.
Furthermore, trade in waste is not consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model (Bergstrand 1985) . The gravity model presumes two-way trade (bilateral trade within a sector) based on monopolistic competition with product differentiation. Waste materials, however, are not compatible with monopolistic competition because production differentiation in waste is not viewed as a positive determinant of the demand for waste imports. Moreover, it is difficult for the gravity model to explain trade in waste when there is firm heterogeneity and selection mechanism of exportingà la Baggs (2009): Only high-productivity firms can export waste. There is no clear selection mechanism in waste exporting. low wage rates that have lax regulations and are not located too far away. Further, we predict that trade in waste will be unidirectional, rather than bilateral.
Stylized facts
In this section, we provide an overview of Japan's exports of recyclable materials (see Appendix Table A .1), from Trade Statistics of Japan (Ministry of Finance of Japan). The first notable feature is that trade in waste typically involves one-way trade. Figure 1 graphs Japanese exports and imports for four main categories of waste (detailed in Appendix Table A .1). Overall, because exports are much larger than imports, the oneway nature of waste trade suggests that the application of the standard gravity model to waste trade is questionable.
Second, exports tend to go to specific countries. Figure 2 shows that Asian countries are the primary export destinations for Japan's waste exports. In particular, China (and Hong Kong) absorbs the overwhelming share of Japan's waste exports. China's dominance in this area is consistent with the findings of Kellenberg (2012) and Michida (2011) , who both document that China is the world's largest importer of waste.
Third, many traded amounts are zero. Table 1 reports the number of positive and zero trades by product destination at the HS-6 digit level from 1998 to 2007, covering 31 foreign countries and 10 years (giving a sample of 310 for each product destination). Although around 10 percent to 30 percent of products by destination are positive, many trade flows amount to zero. This indicates that Japan exports wastes to a few specific countries with lax regulations and instead may not need to export them to all the other countries. 
Data and estimation

Data
We use values (in 1,000 yen) and weights (in kg) from Trade Statistics of Japan (Ministry of Finance of Japan). Our sample includes 31 developed and developing countries, which are Japan's main trading partners (listed in Appendix Table 2 ). The data cover the period from 1998 to 2007. Data on GDP and GDP per capita (both in U.S. dollars) are taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank). Information on distance (in km) is taken from the CEPII. Following Kellenberg (2012) , the environmental stringency index is based on the GCR. We note that environmental variables in our estimation use the difference in the regulation indices between export destination and Japan (see Appendix Table A. 3).
Estimation strategy
To test our hypothesis, we follow Kellenberg (2012) , who first examined the WHH. We use data on the difference in GDP, GDP per capita, and the environmental regulation index between Japan and its export-destination countries. Higher GDP in export destination increases waste exports by Japan because waste is exported to countries with high waste demand. Countries with regulations that are less stringent than Japan take more waste exports. Gaps in GDP per capita are also related to differences in the effectiveness of environmental regulation because low-income developing countries tend to have lax regulations. Indeed, correlations between GDP per capita and environmental regulation are high (see Appendix Table A .4) . For this reason, we also use the environmental regulation index rather than its proxy, GDP per capita. In addition, the estimated unit price of waste provides a proxy for waste quality (in 1,000 yen per kg). Waste quality is relevant, because there is a quality threshold for recycling: Low-quality waste cannot be recycled (Michida, Atici and Michikazu 2011) . 12 Thus, we predict that waste quality will have a positive influence on trade flows. We estimate the following equation: where Trade denotes trade flows of waste product p from Japan to country i in year t, and GDP (GDPCAP) denotes the gap in GDP (GDP per capita) between country i and Japan in year t; that is, GDP it = gdp it − gdp JPNt and GDPCAP it = gdpcap it − gdpcap JPNt . Dist is the geographical distance of country i from Japan. UnitPrice is the unit price of HS-6 product p in year t as a proxy of product quality, which is from Trade Statistics of Japan (Ministry of Finance of Japan). All variables are in natural logarithms. To control for unobserved product characteristics, we include μ, which is an HS-6 digit product and country dummy. EnvReg denotes the environmental regulation gap with Japan. The three types of gap variable used (all taken from the GCR) are based on overall regulation, toxic waste regulation, and air pollution regulation.
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Our main concern is the prevalence of zero values (see Table 1 ). To deal with this problem, we use Tobit panel estimation. We estimate the trade equation based on using both trade values (in yen) and trade quantities (in kg); the latter represents a departure from existing studies. Table 2 reports our Tobit estimation results. Column (1) uses GDP per capita as proxy for environmental regulation. The coefficients on GDP and the per-unit price are positive and significant, whereas the coefficient on distance is negative and significant. Thus, as predicted, the higher a country's GDP and the closer is that country to Japan, the more likely it is to import waste from Japan. In contrast, importer GDP per capita has a negative effect, which indicates that countries with lower per capita incomes are more likely to import Japanese waste. The positive coefficient on waste prices suggests that high-quality waste is more likely to be exported because of the difficulty of recycling low-quality waste. The equations reported in columns (2) through (4) use the environmental regulation index rather than its proxy, GDP per capita. The estimates are more favorable than those in column (1). We find that all of the regulation coefficients are negative and significant, and that the use of regulation indices for specific types of regulation increases the robustness of the results. Thus, it appears that when importing countries implement stringent environmental regulations, they reduce their import of waste products. This result supports the WHH.
Estimation results
Following our baseline estimation, we estimate additional models to check for robustness. For example, in Table 3 we use trade measured by weight (in kg) rather than trade values (in yen) as our dependent variable. As the results show, our predictions are still supported when we work with the alternative measure of trade.
Policy implications
Several policy implications for Asian economies follow from our results. First, all Asian countries imposing substantial tariff rates uniformly on all types of waste might be Kojima (2005) for the derivation of average tariff rates.
effective in reducing waste export. Currently, Asia imposes low or no tariffs on waste. Table 4 shows average tariff rates on waste products in each Asian country, taken from Kojima (2005, 16) . Many Asian countries have no tariffs on waste paper or scrap iron, copper, and aluminium. In particular, Hong Kong sets zero tariff rates on all types of waste. This could be a cause of the waste transit to China. 15 Indeed, the main purpose of imposing tariffs on waste is to prevent illegal movement. Thus, an optimal tariff rate would be one that did not encumber legitimate trade that results in waste going to recycling facilities with environmentally sound technology. In addition, reducing waste trade might lead Japan to promote recycling and reduce waste materials in the production process.
Another worthwhile policy might be to inspect waste in Asian countries before shipment; currently, inspections are enforced only for specific types of waste by some Asian countries. Importing countries suffer from environmental and health problems because waste materials are often contaminated and hazardous. Because many importing countries do not have safe recycling processes and adequate facilities, waste is often not properly disposed of or treated, which harms the surrounding environment. Thus, given the limited capacity of developing countries to enforce regulations, waste exports should be inspected to ensure that only clean and nontoxic recyclables are received by exporting countries. Alternatively, exporting countries might put more resources into improving environment and health controls in importing countries. Such policy schemes could reduce trade in waste across Asian countries. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied Japanese trade in waste and tested the WHH. Using trade data and environmental indices, we found evidence that Asia is an important waste haven for Japanese exports. Japan's stringent environmental regulations prompt Japan to export waste to large developing countries with low per capita income and lax environmental regulations. Exports are higher to neighboring countries and for relatively high-quality waste (with a higher per-unit price). Thus, our results support the WHH.
There are other areas for future research. In the era of globalization, overseas production networks have a strong influence on Asian trade and production patterns. For this reason, we suspect that the dispersion of production processes also affects waste flows. Thus, it may be valuable to focus future work on the relationship between trade in waste and the fragmentation of production in Asia. Another important issue to investigate is the impact of import tariffs on waste flows. In that investigation, we would need tariff rates and value of wastes in each export destination and each waste. 
